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The article, based on reflections from on-going ethnographic research in central 
China’s Muslim and Catholic female communities, links indigenous notions of 
‘modernity’ with religious identity and changing gender politics. Maria Jaschok 
argues that a growing de-centralization of the Chinese state apparatus and the 
concomitant emergence of civil space, however tentative or circumscribed, contribute 
to a society in which sources and processes of ‘liberation’, of the nation and of its 
women, are no longer axiomatic. Moreover, political tensions may bring in their wake 
volatility and uncertainty but, so Jaschok maintains, these also engender 
opportunities for aspirations, motivations, practises, and social engagement which 
are religiously infused! A modern, progressive, believing Chinese female citizen, 
assertive of her identity – it appears this may no longer be quite the oxymoron it once 
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The theme of the conference which gave rise to this paper prompted participants to 
think about Gender and Religion as a 21
st century phenomenon and problematic.
2 For 
me the challenge involved relating from within my work in China questions over 
predicaments of religious identity as linked to local issues of gender and modernity. It 
entailed reflecting on interpretations of ‘the 21
st century’ on the part of women who 
constitute members of my communities of informants: Chinese religious women, 
specifically, Hui Muslims and Catholics who are living in the provincial city milieu of 
central China. How do these women experience and negotiate the multiple influences 
of political ideology, religious norms and commercial desires which complicate 
public discourses on ‘modernity’ as a desired outcome of social worth and 
achievement? Outlining the socio-political environment in which they live, I am 
reflecting on the changing place of religion in Chinese society which since 1949 has 
been ruled by a Communist Party/state unwaveringly hostile to religious groups. I 
want to ask what has been the impact on religious minorities, and on religious women 
in particular, of the state’s relentless drive for control of the nation and consolidation 
of superpower status internationally (the trope of the ‘Pacific Century’ is now a staple 
of many an international meeting, Nonini and Ong, 1997), of a political history in 
China which allied ‘modernity’ for so long to scientific rationality, socialist progress 
and secular ideology and relegated religion, along with other ‘feudal fetters’, to the 
status of subversive Other?   Finally, does ‘being religious’ (as a growing number of 
Chinese assert they are) make a difference to how mainstream society discourses, and 
practices, ‘being Chinese in the 21
st century’?  (As these reflections arise from local 
ethnographic investigation, any generalisations are by necessity tentative, intended to 
throw up lines of thought and not generate questionable empirical fixities.) 
 
I  shall make use of insights and data from our study
3 of Islamic female sites, 
qingzhen nüsi or women’s mosques, in particular of our study of the Beida Women’s 
Mosque in Zhengzhou city, Henan province, and from the study of a Catholic site, 
Zhugu Xiunüyuan or Sister of Providence Convent, in Kaifeng city, also in Henan 
province. Insights from our on-going research project, based largely on fieldwork and 
oral history life testimonies, suggest a shared understanding among these religious 
women of ‘modernity’, xiandaihua, as a volatile present-day time, which is felt both 
to be instilling trepidation and to be inspiring hope, even optimism. Trepidation, 
because a modernizing Chinese society brings with it loss of previous certainties as to 
guaranteed livelihood, social and welfare benefits, children’s education, adding the 
unaccustomed vagaries of market society; hope, because legitimate access to 
comprehensive material and social benefits accruing to Chinese people under a 
Maoist/Stalinist state apparatus was predicated on politically correct identities that 
excluded members of religious groups. Modernity, understood as a loosening of state 
control and as a growing social space in which diverse, and alternative, identities find 
expression, is thus bringing also a sense of freedom from the constraints of a 
developmentalist uni-linearity by which peripheralized members of society were 
                                                 
2 October 1
st, 2004. Gender and Religion in the 21
st Century.  Convened by Faculty of Theology, 
University of Copenhagen. 
3  These observations come from on-going collaborative ethnographic work of more than ten years’ 
duration.. My colleague, the Chinese Hui Muslim sociologist Shui Jingjun from the Henan Academy of 
Social Sciences in Zhengzhou, and I have focused largely on the history and place of female religious 
communities in Central China,  zhongyuan diqu, comprising the provinces of Henan,  Shanxi, Hebei 
and Shandong .  
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measured by their remoteness from, or closeness to, Communist ideals of ‘progress’ 
and ‘modernity’ (Berktay 1998; Chow 1993).  
 
Suddenly temporalities of another kind can be demonstrated in the cautious 
reawakening of religious faith, enabling believers to reach back into the long-
suppressed past of religious ancestry and to recover hope for a meaningful future 
through revitalisation of muted traditions. Or, to quote Carol Delaney, what is now 
possible is a ‘recuperation of society’ (1991) in the open living of faith, enactment of 
ritual worship, and practice of religious life-style, in which core beliefs in the future 
as promised ‘eternal life’ are embedded. Illustrations of these expressions of 
religiously infused ‘modernity’ introduce, first, Muslim women’s current project of 
collecting and transcribing sacred chants, jingge, long a tradition of women’s mosque, 
and until recent times ‘forgotten’ and, secondly, outline Catholic nuns’ initiatives to 
engage more closely, and meaningfully, with their local community. My argument is 
that we note evidence of ever more diverse participation in public discourses on 
societal core values, debates in which religious groups are beginning to voice 
alternative understandings of modernity and development that have resonance for 
society at large. 
 
Religion: definitions and contingencies 
The Chinese term for religion, zongjiao, is of Japanese origin and imported into China 
as recently as the late 19
th century (Leung 1996). The volatility of its history is 
expressed in the shifting and multiple meanings of zongjiao; it may have the 
connotation of ‘past-ness’ expressing the era of China’s semi-colonial status, when 
Western military might and imperial weakness allowed unprecedented missionary 
inroads into Chinese society (MacInnis 1972, 1989; Uhalley and Wu 2001).  Its 
connotation can also be past-ness understood as ‘feudal society’, associated with 
backwardness and ignorance (accusations levelled at members of religious groups, 
particularly during times of political campaigns). Reference can also be to 
connotations of ‘peripheral’ or ‘deficient’ cultures (where particular ethnic groups are 
identified in terms of religious faith, such as the Hui/Muslim group, Jaschok and Shui 
2000) or, in times of political crisis, religion may  be conflated with official treatment 
of ‘non-conformism’ or ‘splittism’ in general (Leung 1996). Given the contingency 
and arbitrariness of meaning and official treatment, it is not difficult to understand 
why for many Chinese zongjiao still represents, in certain respects, the very negation 
of positive collective aspiration for modernity, and for its equation with national 
sovereignty and progress, prosperity and order. 
 
Constitutional rights and mechanisms of control  
What are the legal protections given to religious practice? Who is protected, under 
what circumstances? How are sites of collective worship administered?  
 
The freedom of religious belief is enshrined in Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution 
(1982) which says:  
  
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, 
public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any 
religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any 
religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS125                                                Page 4   




Rights enshrined in the Chinese Constitution are more narrow than the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Arts. 18/1920) and the 1991 UN General Assembly 
Resolution on the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (Ibid.). The prerogative of power is the 
prerogative of classification and categorization. Some things are deemed proper, legal 
and are thus granted the right to exist subject to the state’s criteria. Other religious 
organizations are deemed subversive and too diffuse to be controlled, and are thus 
prohibited, subjected to persecution, and are invisible in the grand narratives of 
national history. For these existence is precarious and unpredictable. 
 
What are the tools of control? Five ‘authentic’ religions come within the authority of 
the Administration of the Bureau of Religious Affairs and its monitoring bodies: 
Islam (overseen by the Chinese Islamic Association), Daoism (Chinese Daoist 
Association), Protestantism (China Christian Council and Three-Self Patriotic 
Movement
5, Catholicism (Chinese Catholic Bishops Conference and Chinese Catholic 
Patriotic Association). ‘Non-authentic’ religions, such as ‘sects’, ‘cults’ and 
‘underground churches’ come under the surveillance of the public security apparatus.    
 
As regards mechanisms of control, tight registration procedures for approved sites of 
religious activity were imposed by the Chinese State Council. In 1994, Regulations 
Regarding the Management of Places of Religious Activity defined rules on proper 
sites and qualifications of religious professionals in charge of such sites. In the same 
year, Registration Procedures for Venues for Religious Activities presented 
comprehensive procedures for successful registration, and in 1996, inspection of 
religious sites and amendment of rules of registration were laid down in Method for 
the Annual Inspection of Places of Religious Activities. In all, these mechanisms 
differed from the Universal Declaration in making freedom of religion equivalent to 
freedom of private belief (see Human Rights Watch Asia report of 1997, footnote 3). 
 
Statistical information regarding the size of Muslim and Catholic population varies, 
depending on the source consulted. As an approximation, there are between 18 to 25 
million Muslims (constituted of ten ethnic groups, Islam thus constituting an ethnic 
religion in China); the Hui group, which I research, constitutes about half of the total 
population. There are about 4 to 10 million Catholics.
6  These are very rough 
estimates, due to the many unregistered religious sites for which there are no 
membership lists and due to the very nebulous criteria for what constitute ‘believers’ 
(e.g., not every pastor is ordained, not every Protestant is baptised, and so on).  
 
Place of religion under Communist rule since 1949  
Whilst initially the relationship was one of a united front, where religious 
organizations could identify with principles of justice, liberty, equality, so the 
Catholic theologian Joseph Tong observes (1999), this was short-lived. What ensued 
                                                 
4 Quoted from Human Rights Watch Asia (1997:139) China: state control of religion. Retrieved from 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/china1/ 
5 ‘Three Self’ refers to: self-governing, self-supporting, and self-propagating. 
6 Chinese government estimates are of 100 million believers in toto, out of a population of ca. 1.2 
billion. But these estimates have remained the same since the 1950s.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS125                                                Page 5   
was a violent suppression of all forms of religious expression, collective and 
individual, institutional and private, to ensure an unconditional claim on the part of 
the Party/state to national power and loyalty. The Chinese state acquired the character 
of a ‘movement regime’ (H. Arendt’s term, used by the sociologist Y.H. Chu 
1997:74) with endless streams of decrees, campaigns, movements or selective 
punitive sanctions inscribing and reinforcing boundary markers of state identity. ‘The 
constitution of the people-as-one”, Chu noted, ‘requires the incessant production of 
enemies’ (Ibid.) – among them Christians, Falungong practitioners, house pastors, 
wupo (witches/charismatic leaders), and the like. Such outright persecution (still 
under-documented, still muted) gave way to more indirect mechanisms of control 
only in the late 1970s. That decades of oppression did not erase religiosity, speaks to 
the enduring faith of those who preserved the knowledge, dared to practise and 
congregate in secret, and dared to conceal sacred artefacts (from all accounts, women 
were vital carriers of religious knowledge).  
 
Religion, communist liberation of women and secularized modernity 
Particular source of tension has been the large, and ever growing, number of female 
believers, and of female religious leaders. After all, women had been held to 
constitute the greatest beneficiaries of the Communist revolution, indeed the Party’s 
‘solution’ of the women’s problem so-called was both the central symbolic and 
political act of legitimacy of the Communist mandate to govern. Regardless of the 
mixed record of women’s road to nan-nü pingdeng (sexual equality), a record which 
is coming under ever closer and critical scrutiny of international and Chinese scholars 
alike, I would argue that women’s liberation continues to define for the Communist 
Party the superiority of its political and legal system in the same way it once defined 
the struggle for national liberation. Thus Gilmartin, Hershatter, Rofel and White, in an 
introduction to a seminal anthology, Engendering China, point out that the 
‘Communist Party used ‘women’s liberation as one of the key categories through 
which it justified its revolutionary promise’ (1994:9).  
 
Vivienne Jabri (1996) speaks of the ‘myth of origin’ which sacralizes oppressive 
relationships of dependency. ‘Origin myths are generally thought to form the basis of 
truth of claims about the authenticity’’ so says Dru Gladney (2004:123) in a study of 
Communist state ideology. What is not sufficiently recognized are the multiple 
implications for women believers whose faith left them outside, even a negation of, 
the Communist ‘myth of origin’ (I am not able to go into this in greater detail, but see 
Jaschok 2003). My argument is that eradication of religion (defined by Mao as one of 
the four ‘feudal fetters’) and construction of socialist womanhood, a paradigm awash 
with socialist rhetoric, were both defining elements of the state’s formative phase of 
consolidation. Attacks on religious believers were, as argued above, connotative of 
attacks on a backward (feudal) past, on an era of humiliating colonial encroachments 
and on crippling international dependences. Within a matrix of Communist creation 
myths, women’s liberation narratives, particularly in the most ideology-driven phase 
of national consolidation after 1949, excluded, and stigmatized those women who 
continued to identify themselves as religious believers; and these women came to 
embody everything considered obstructing the path to progress and enlightenment, 
that is, those attributes on which were predicated state-created utopia of the new era, 
of new society, of new rights, and of a new people.  
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Education of the modern socialist citizen was the great revolutionary task of the 1950s 
and secular, science-informed modernity, at the heart of this educational movement. 
The history of the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF)’s early campaigns 
illuminates the sustained attempts to shape Chinese women into socialist, science-
minded, sober housewives and labourers with proper political consciousness. 
Scholarship which covers those years shows how important, and how ‘difficult’, it 
was for women to fanshen, to turn from ‘superstition’ to ‘enlightened’ socialist 
subjects (for example, Davin 1979; Wolf 1985). 
 
In such a context, the paradigmatic Maoist paradigm of Chinese womanhood was 
constructed on the back of religion (Susan Harding 1991). Much of Communist Party 
legitimacy and credibility for claims of liberation of the nation might be said to have 
resided in the claim to have liberated women from ties of patriarchy and feudalism, 
foremost from the opiate of religion, locking the success of the Communist state’s 
development of the nation into women’s development. And it became largely 
axiomatic that one must entail the other in a tightly gendered sequence of 
development that still shapes the raison d’etre of the ACWF: xian nan, hou nü, 
women follow in the wake of men. 
 
Even in these more market-orientated times when considerations of national strength, 
international standing, positive investment climate, enrichment of cultural life, 
pragmatic use of national and international development resources, and so on, have 
brought with them greater decentralisation of the state, certain taboos remain, one of 
these concerns state treatment of organized religion. The Party, as ever, does not 
countenance rival claims to liberation besides Communist liberation. Whilst women’s 
organizations are allowed to multiply alongside, some even outside, the nation-wide 
branches of the ACWF, assisting the state in needful reforms in the area of women’s 
labour and employment conditions, education, participation in health and welfare 
campaigns, and the like, exploiting more relaxed State policies to obtain funding also 
from international funding agencies and NGOs, religious women’s organizations face 
obstacles which, whilst in certain respects most familiar to non-religious women’s 
organizations (lack of funding, uncertain legitimacy of ‘popular’ organizations, etc), 
are heightened by religious identity (Hsiung et al 2001). Religious institutions 
confront persistent difficulties: they operate under surveillance, under highly 
circumscribed state regulations and rules, always subject to sudden, often arbitrary, 
fluctuations in official treatment. As pointed out earlier, the historian of Catholicism 
in China, Beatrice Leung (1996) maintains that religious treatment fluctuates in line 
with treatment of non-conformists in general (Tiananmen massacre; Falungong 
repression; etc). So Shui Jingjun writes in a recent article: ‘Some religious women’s 
organizations would like the support and recognition of institutions such as the 
ACWF, and a number of religious women intellectuals seek to join the women’s 
movement at large, but they are ignored and their demands neglected’ (2001:115).
7    
 
The role of scholarship, as far as religious women’s lives are concerned, can be said 
in the early years of Communist consolidation to have been tightly wedded to the 
                                                 
7 Shui cites the example of the senior women’s mosque administrator Dan Ye’s failure to make 
Zhengzhou city Women’s Federation members acknowledge the counselling and welfare work of the 
Beida Women’s Mosque. However, there are also signals which point to a more liberal outlook on the 
part of individual members of the local Women’s Federation. 
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Chinese state project of creating secularized citizens for a socialist utopia. This has 
characterized Chinese scholarship as much as Western feminist scholars. Generally 
speaking, the study of ‘the Chinese woman’ entailed a tracking of progress for which 
criteria were supplied by Maoist ideology: ‘liberation’ as state steered through 
legislation, political campaigns and social movements have all facilitated a mono-
paradigmatic womanhood. ACWF-employed researchers, and indeed Chinese 
academics, were in the service of an overriding national project of industrialization, 
militarization and modernization which until recent years allowed only for one path to 
women’s liberation. Hannah Papanek (1973) refers to the way that scholarship can be 
complicit in valorisation of sanctioned values as a ‘protective denial’ - here the denial 
of rigid exclusion of long female religious traditions of alternative faith and faith-
informed practices from master narratives of women’s history. Chinese researchers 
worked largely within orthodox Marxist frameworks in which economics dictated the 
fate of the nation and formed the base for women’s quest for equality. Education, 
vocational training, employment conditions, all were matters of concern to 
scholarship that shaped questions over women’s lives within the binary of 
enlightenment, modernity and economic progress defined on the back of feudal and 
backward, because religion-bound, Others (Harding 1991).  
 
When religion did not wither away during the days of starkest repression and re-
emerged as a powerful force under more liberal policies in the 1980s, the reason so 
many women adhered to religious belief, as explained by women’s historian Du 
Fangqin in 1988, must be seen as expression of their vulnerability, even victim status 
under sometimes brutal conditions of nascent capitalism. Women’s inclination for 
superstition, for comforting religious panacea, underlined it appears, yet again a 
fundamental inferiority of the female nature. Whilst expressive of societal 
inequalities, the high percentage of female participation in all religions seems 
therefore to have perpetuated also an essentialized notion of feminine gullibility and 
of weak reason (Du 1988). Given that the 21
st century in China is still a time when 
ideological legacies of Maoist revolutionary antagonism towards religion continue to 
underwrite Chinese state rhetoric on ‘modernity’, on ‘liberation’, on ‘equality’ and on 
‘justice’, and so on, as predicated on the withering away of religion, it is of interest to 
note that recently this same historian published two articles on the implications for 
gender studies of current research on religion and gender in China. She also indicates 
a growing awareness on her part of the need to diversify what too long has been the 
mono-paradigmatic interpretation of women’s aspirations and ideals (Du 2004)! 
Whilst not representing the whole Chinese women’s studies community, nevertheless 
Du is a leading force academically and organizationally in China.  
 
 
Modernity as freedom to be religious 
Our study investigates women’s own sites of worship and congregation, often with a 
long and rich history, in diverse religious traditions within the local culture of Kaifeng 
city and environment and also of Zhengzhou city, which became the provincial capital 
of Henan province after 1949. We contend that what makes our work so interesting is 
the fact that at the time of our research, this diverse ethnic and religious local culture 
is developing complex transnational ties of network and allegiance. These 
transnational ties are sometimes related to historical origins but some have also more 
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mosque as recent pilgrimages by the pope to Lourdes are the subject of lively 
conversation among Kaifeng’s Catholic nuns.)  
 
Our investigative concerns are the historical and cultural specificities which have 
shaped the characteristic features of local sites: foremost, certain religious and cultural 
gender codes which segregated men and women. We have studied how segregation 
has in some communities become a desire for autonomy, expressed when women’s 
mosques eagerly registered in 1994 as official religious sites, understanding 
government regulations as affirmation of women’s equal legal standing and equal 
claims to political representation and economic rights (Jaschok and Shui 2000).  
 
Furthermore, identity as Chinese citizens, through recourse to Maoist precepts of 
gender egalitarianism and rights of equality extended into the religious sphere, are 
troubling the boundaries of what are politically regimented sites of officially 
acknowledged worship and entrenched state categories of ‘deficient Chinese’. One 
might argue that religious women use the Communist Party’s ‘myth of origin’ for 
their own ends. This can be observed when Muslim women in Henan, with the tacit 
support of local Party officials, take a stand against international Islamic orthodoxy 
which forbids female ahong (a title tantamount to imam)-led independent women’s 
mosques (Jaschok and Shui 2000). Indigenization of religion, a consequence in part of 
the state’s prohibition of foreign interference in China’s religious organizations, is 
serving women’s interests in unforeseen ways.  
 
It is now possible to observe more pro-active religious engagement in society and thus 
the beginning of a challenge to the developmentalist ideology of the Chinese state. 
Organized religious women are engaging in social causes, mostly involving 
marginalized social groups. It will be interesting to observe future developments as 
religious women (whether through temple, mosque, or convent organization) are 
beginning to pledge themselves to greater service for community and for the nation – 
with an important, if still un-uttered, caveat: the values underlying this contribution 
are religiously infused.  
 
1. ordering the past 
The history of women’s mosques is a long one, its unique manifestation of 
independent institutions, nüxue or nüsi (women’s [Koranic] school or women’s 
mosque) goes back over 300 years, emerging from complex historical and socio-
political negotiations over the nature of Muslim identity in Chinese diaspora and over 
means to keep faith alive and religio-ethnic identity intact. The incorporation of 
women into educational projects during late Ming and early Qing Islamic renaissance 
(17
th century), inspired by Hui Muslim intellectuals and educationalists, was born of 
the need to bring religious knowledge into families and families into mosques (Allès 
2000; Jaschok and Shui 2000). The growth and consolidation of women’s own space 
of worship, education and congregation were only halted with the religious 
persecutions of the 1950s, and only hesitantly resumed in the course of less repressive 
government treatment of religions during the 1980s. The long period of persecution 
and silencing of religious expression scars the memories still. Women’s mosques have 
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anew, most especially since the late 1990s
8; but women’s connection with the past 
was too violently ruptured in vicious political campaigns and movements to make 
remembering anything but a painful groping for a golden past when religion ordered 
communal meaning.  
 
When we researched into what Shui Jingjun and I knew had been a flourishing feature 
of female religious culture, women’s jingge (religious chants)
9 , we initially 
encountered silence, feigned ignorance, even outright refusal to acknowledge such a 
past tradition. It began to change when, on one afternoon, an old lady began to chant.  
                                          
 
Chanting jingge, at women’s mosque in Henan Province
10        
 
Everyone was enthralled, particularly as none of the younger women and girls had 
ever heard jingge. From this unexpected beginning, when the elderly Muslim woman 
Li Xiangrong recalled a chant known as kuhua (Grieving Song), women together with 
researchers have begun to collect chants, sometimes mere fragments, which were 
once the staple of women’s mosques. Li Xiangrong, from the famous Wangjia Hutong 
Women’s Mosque in Kaifeng, has stirred rememberings in others of her generation, 
and the elderly women have begun to teach kuhua to young girls and have started to 
talk of what life was like for earlier generations of women, particularly the years 
before the 1949 Communist government, when jingge were at their height of 
popularity. The chants are now starting to be revived also in neighbouring mosques, 
with ahong (resident female religious leader) eager to prompt older believers’ 
memory before it is too late. And a bridge is thus spanned across a lost time, with 
these jingge communicating the suffering, joys, the faith and aspirations of past 
generations of believing women for younger women to hear and to listen to.  
 
But the women who begin to recall old ways of life in which the culture of jingge was 
embedded are also reaching back into faith which springs from determination to 
confront vicissitudes. David Coplan remarks that ‘Oral genres are a people’s 
autobiographical ethnography’ (1991:47) in which identity and self-definition are 
formulated and maintained. Suddenly the search for ancestry and tradition is 
spreading among our women informants. And it is now possible for religious leaders 
                                                 
8 Although no statistics on women’s mosques are available, in Muslim communities in provinces in 
central China the norm is increasingly that where men have their mosque, women too lay claim to one. 
In some communities, women’s mosques outnumber men’s mosques (Jaschok and Shui 2000). 
9 For history and classification of the genre of jingge, see our chapter in Women in China: The 
Republican Period in Historical Perspective. Edited by Mechthild Leutner and Nicola Spakowski. 
Münster: LIT (forthcoming). 
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such as the influential Islamic woman scholar and ahong, Du Shuzhen from the 
largest independent women’s mosque in Zhengzhou, to commission transcription and 
compilation of a first ever anthology of women’s jingge. Past-ness is coming to be 
filled with sentiments to counter the negative connotation ascribed for so long by 
society to believing people; and modernity, seemingly paradoxically, is used as a 
freedom to be religious and to begin to reconnect with the emotions in which their 
faith had its origins. By doing so, these religious women are also beginning to 
disengage from the Communist ‘myth of origin’ of liberation until recently so firmly 
predicated on the death of alternative visions of liberation.  
 
2. recovering the future    
 
Zhugu nun, Kaifeng 2004, researching religious ancestry     
 
Issues of modernity, as I asserted above, invite issues of legitimacy of engagement in 
societal change. Such an increasingly confident assertion as to the right ‘not to be the 
same’ comes from women in my second case study: the Catholic Zhugu (Providence 
Sisters) Convent in Kaifeng, Henan province. Now exclusively comprised of Chinese 
nuns, many locally born, their beginnings go back to November 1920 when the 
American Sisters of Providence, from St Mary’s of the Woods, Indiana, arrived that 
month in Kaifeng, to provide most importantly, and ultimately very successfully,  
education for girls, both at primary and high school level. They were active locally 
until 1950, when all American nuns, and some Chinese nuns and catechists, were 
forced to leave the country.    
 
Since the 1980s, particularly so since the late 1990s, the Zhugu Sisters have begun to 
re-engage in educational and charitable causes. Their projects express an emphatic 
identification with marginalized groups: whether these are abandoned infants, 
handicapped children and adults, old people, and, most recently, abused and battered 
wives.  
   
In many of my interviews, young Zhugu nuns make reference to the early pre-
Communist days, when their congregation set up its first Chinese mission, in order to 
express their understanding of what is ‘Chineseness’ to a modern and devout 
Christian, how this might differ from views held by previous generations of Christian 
Chinese, and how nowadays, in 2004, they negotiate tensions between what is a 
fervent local nationalism and what are core transnational (Catholic) values. Important 
contemporary issues of identity and citizenship are related to perceptions of the 
different positions adopted by early founder nuns. Thus not all American nuns in this 
early phase are condemned as imperialist; on the other hand, not all are admired. 
Without detailed knowledge of their founders, Chinese informants associate certain 
nuns with the status of ‘true ancestress’ (fieldwork July 2004), and only their 
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ways to earliest Chinese converts/nuns (often their own great-aunt or from a family 
known to them) as having demonstrated similarly diverse viewpoint and allegiances.  
 
Sister Marie Gratia Luking      (1885-1964), founder of the Kaifeng mission, 
whose photograph is displayed prominently on the reception room table of the Kaifeng Zhugu 
Convent; she is referred to as ‘our Chinese mother’ by the young nuns I interviewed in 2004 
because of her knowledge of, and respect for, Chinese language and culture. 
 
Reconnection to the past has allowed for the more nuanced construction of ancestry, 
simultaneously, cautious revitalizing of transnational ties and allegiances, not only 
with mother houses and sister convents elsewhere in Asia but also with international 
religious funding institutions, invite questions over the ultimate place such sites may 
occupy in China’s rapidly modernizing society.  
 
Religious identities and multiple constructs of modernity 
The ‘expressive culture’ (borrowing a term from the anthropologist Rubie S. Watson, 
1991) of Henan, China’s most populous and centrally located province, is marked by 
lively ethnic and religious pluralism. We are observing how de-centralization of the 
state apparatus, economic re-structuring and social change, are facilitating the 
emergence of a civil space in which alternative religious beliefs find expression. This 
is taking the form either of an exemplary religious life-style on the part of individual 
believers or, until recently unthinkable, educational and welfare initiatives organised, 
financed, and led by religious groups.  
 
I have discussed the attention paid by religious organisations to their ancestry, either 
through their own historical research or often in conjunction, or in collaboration, with 
a researcher. Increasingly, such a reinsertion of the religious ancestor into current 
claims to various rights is done with pride and an assertion to differ. I have also drawn 
attention to observations as to how believers take advantage of opportunities in a 
changing society to express an alternative faith and aspiration. With this comes a 
religious expression of modernity and progress and a challenge to officially 
sanctioned concepts of what exactly constitutes progress in a society in which 
religious pluralism has constitutional sanction (if circumscribed and never to be taken 
for granted). Multiple social, educational and charitable projects are adding specific 
religious dimensions to notions and practices of development at local level. For the 
researcher it becomes an imperative to investigate differently positioned subjectivities 
and how they express relationships between personhood and community, community 
and nation, nation and global society. 
 
The tradition of segregated, gendered space for women in China has interesting 
implications in this modernizing society, not all yet sufficiently understood, but QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS125                                                Page 12   
already apparent in religious women’s specific contributions to their society, whether 
on the part of Catholic nuns or of Muslim believers, suffering from the inequalities 
which arise from the impact of rapid industrialization and unchecked market forces on 
society’s most vulnerable peoples.  
 
In conclusion I would like to quote from a forthcoming article which I co-authored 




Especially as far as women believers are concerned, current Chinese culture is moulded by 
secular orientation. The religious culture that determines their lives and subjectivities lead to a 
marginal position of women believers, socially and academically, even to their invisibility in 
the public (secular) spheres of society … And yet we have discovered Muslim women to 
constitute an active religious group, enriching both the history of Chinese Muslims and 
Chinese history at large. Silence or absence is not equal to non-existence and to the lack of 
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